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I. Introduction 
This paper is the basis of studying the impact of financial service trade negotiation under 
the General agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) on the banking sector in developing 
countries. To test the impact, the first step is measuring the commitments in financial service trade 
negotiation. This paper measured members’ commitments in the FIFTH PROTOCOL TO GATS. 
The focus of this paper is the core business of commercial banks, including deposit and credit 
services, whose definition is specified in section III. 
II. The Efforts to measure the Commitments in previous literatures 
Since the end of Uruguay round negotiation, there are a few literatures trying to assess the 
outcomes of service trade negotiation including that of financial service. B.Hoekman (1995)1 made 
the tentative first step to measure the commitments on financial service trade2 liberalization of all 
WTO members at the end of Uruguay round negotiation. As he said, he “guesstimated” the 
liberalization degree reflected by the commitments because of lack of statistical support. He 
quantified the commitments in two dimensions. One is the relative restrictiveness of different 
measures, which is classified into three categories, “unbound”, “none” and “bound”3. The other is 
the relative importance of the modes of supply in specific sectors .Value of 0, 0.5 and 1 were 
attached to “unbound”, “bound” and “none” respectively to scale the restrictiveness of 
commitments. For each of the four modes, a weight was given as shown in table 1, “reflecting a 
subjective assessment of the relative importance of the modes.”  
 
Table 1: B. Hoekman (1995)’s mode weights 
Sector Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4 
banking 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1 
 
A. Mattoo (1999)4 quantified the commitments on financial services trade liberalization of 
all developing members5 of WTO as part of the conclusion of the negotiation in 1997. He argued 
                                                     
 This Paper was first presented at a WTO Seminar in Geneva, Switzerland in August 2006. Permission has been 
granted by the author to reprint this article here. 
 Zhang is a PhD candidate in the School of Public Policy & Management at Tsinghua University, Beijing, PRC 
1 Hoekman, B. “Tentative first steps: an assessment of the Uruguay Round agreement on services”. Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 1455, 1995, The World Bank. 
2 He studied commitments of all the service sectors by 1994. Financial services are part of them. 
3 “Bound” means any kind of limitation 
4 Mattoo, A. “Financial Services and the World Trade Organization: Liberalization Commitments of the Developing 
and Transition Economies”. Policy Research Working Paper WPS 2184. 1999.  World Bank. 
5 The definition of developing members in Mattoo (1999), which includes the least developed members, is different 
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that “the limitation maybe on coverage or in the form of a restrictive measure (which can be one or 
more of the six types of restrictions listed in Article XVI of GATS). Many members impose 
restrictions on the legal form of commercial presence … . It is assumed that such restrictions are 
less burdensome than those which limit entry or the extent of foreign equity participation.” With 
respect to mode 3, it adopted a slightly sophisticated approach, which was “first identifying the 
most restrictive measure specified and then applying a value based on an assessment of its 
restrictiveness.” “The presence of any of the following limitations led to the indicated value being 
attached (regardless of whether other less restrictive measures were also applied)”. See table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Mattoo’s Scoring criterion 
Limitation Score 
No new entry or unbound for new entry   0.1 
Discretionary licensing for new entry 0.25 
Ceiling on foreign equity at less than 50% 0.5 
Ceiling on foreign equity at more than 50% 0.75 
Restrictions on the legal form of commercial presence 0.75 
Other minor restrictions 0.75 
 
 
With respect to mode 1 and 26, he simply attached a value of 0.5 in all case of restrictions 
on the first two modes. He argued that “in the case of the first two modes, restrictions often take 
the form of excluding certain sub-sectors from the scope of the commitment”. “It’s difficult to 
judge the economic significance of these exclusions”. Finally, to the most definite entries of 
“unbound” and “none”, values of zero and one are attached respectively with respect to each mode. 
To distinguish the different importance of modes of supply, he figured out a “modal 
weights in banking” shown in table 3, which were based on US trade statistics and estimated by the 
author7. 
  
Table 3: Mattoo (1999)’s mode weights 
 Cross-border supply Consumption abroad Commercial presence 
Deposits 0.12 0.03 0.85 
Lending 0.2 0.05 0.75 
 
N.Valckx8 modified A.Mattoo’s measures in the way that divided the entries of A.Matto’s 
scoring criteria in detail. See table 4. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
from this paper.  
6 Only mode 1 to 3 is measured in Mattoo (1999) 
7 According to Mattoo (1999), US is the only country reports statistics on establishment trade on a regular basis. 
8  Valckx, N. “WTO financial services liberalization: Measurement, Choice and Impact on Financial Stability”. 
Research Memorandum WO No.705. 2002.  De Nederlandsche Bank. 
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Table 4: N.Valckx’s Limitations Scores 
Limitations Scores 
No listing 0 
Unbound against relevant mode 0.05 
No new entry or unbound for new entry   0.1 
Discretionary licensing, economic needs test 0.25 
Limited commitments 0.25 
Reciprocity 0.25 
Licensing and / or authorization requirements (by ministry 
of finance or government); acquisition approval without 
mentioning terms, conditions, or procedures 
0.3 
Licensing and / or authorization requirements by supervisor 
(central bank, other regulator); acquisition approval with 
clear indications and guiding principles (laws, rulings,etc) 
0.35 
Voting or ownership < 50% 0.5 
Limitation on legal form, number of operations (branches), 
ownership > 50%, types of operations (branches versus 
subsidiaries), value of transactions or assets 
0.75 
None 1 
  
 
 
In order to aggregate a member’s sector and mode scores, N.Valckx (2002) employed 
principal component analysis (PCA) constructing three main indicators for members’ 
commitments. A.Kireyev (2002)9 calculated the scores of commitments on financial service trade 
liberalization based on table 4. But he calculated arithmetic mean of scores of modes as aggregate 
scores of members instead of employing PCA. 
It’s easy to find that previous studies have made great progress on measuring financial 
service trade commitments. But there are still some questions remaining. First, regarding relative 
restrictiveness of different commitments, a series of measures were listed in a sequence of 
limitation degree and judged on a scale of 0 to 1. However, most of those measures are not 
mutually exclusive. Many of those are often inscribed in a member’s schedule simultaneously. In 
such case, how shall we choice the scores? For example, in table 4, there are two restrictive 
measures, “voting or ownership < 50%” and “limitation on legal form”, attached scores of 0.5 and 
0.75 respectively. If one member committed both of them and another member only took one 
measure, “voting or ownership < 50%”, both of them therefore was scored 0.5. It’s irrational to say 
the former is as restrictive as the latter. Another question is how to treat the different measures 
committed in different sub-sectors in a member’s schedule because even the smallest sector 
category, such as lending, in previous studies, also covers several sub-sectors. 
Second, regarding the modes’ weights, two types of methods are applied. One is estimating 
the weights subjectively based on experiences, common sense or American statistics. Another is 
                                                     
9 Kireyev, A. “Liberalization of Trade in Financial Services and Financial Sector Stability (analytical approach )”. IMF 
Working Paper WP/02/138. 2002. Geneva, International Monetary Fund Office in Geneva. 
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calculating the weights statistically through principal component analysis. For the former, its pitfall 
is obviously. Subjective estimation may lead to difference between estimates and reality and 
variance between different researchers. Although American statistics can provide an objective 
statistical basis, different developing levels among members reduce its reference value greatly. For 
the latter, PCA or factor analysis do provide an alternative way to aggregate the original scores. 
But careful exam should be made case by case because statistically constructed factors are often 
too abstract to explain or understand. 
III. The original data for quantifying 
This paper tries to measure the commitments on core business of commercial banks of 
WTO developing members. These commitments came from the FIFTH PROTOCOL TO THE 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES,10 which, entering into force in 1999, is 
the outcome of financial service trade negotiation among WTO members under GATS. However, 
commitments of members, who didn’t participate in the negotiation in 1997, came from the 
SECOND PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT OF TRADE IN SERVICES, 
entering into force in 1996. For those members who acceded to WTO after 1999, their 
commitments came from their protocol of accession.  
All of the developing members of WTO are included in this study. However, there isn’t a 
definition of developing countries in WTO or other international organizations. WTO has the 
definition of least developed countries and World Bank has an academic standard to distinguish 
developed and developing countries, which is often used in its working papers. This paper, based 
on both of these definitions, excepting the least developed members and developed members, 
covers all the remaining 90 members.  
a. Definition of core services of commercial bank 
This paper doesn’t study all the financial services but the core business of commercial 
banks, which are deposit and credit services. According to article 5(v) and (vi) in ANNEX ON 
FINANCIAL SERVICES TO GATS, deposit service is “acceptance of deposits and other 
repayable funds from the public” and credit service is “lending of all types, including consumer 
credit, mortgage credit, factoring and financing of commercial transaction”. 
According to GUIDELINES FOR THE SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 
UNDER GATS, such general definition can be classified in a specific and standard way which is 
the UN provisional central product classification11. See table 5 
Table 3.1 also shows the sectoral scope in this study, which includes the sub-sectors of 5-
digit code of UN CPCprov: 81115, 81116, 81119, 81131, 81132, 81133, 8113912. Some members’ 
commitments cover all of them, but some only cover part of them. The coverage of all 90 
                                                     
10 Brazil, Philippines and Jamaica have not accepted the FIFTH PROTOCOL TO GATS. 
11 Department of International Economics and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Provisional 
Central Product, Statistical Paper Series M No.77. ( New York: UN, 1991) 
12 According to GUIDELINES FOR THE SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS UNDER GATS, 81117, 
non-central bank currency issue, is also include in deposit service. Because many members haven’t such sub-sector, 
this paper excludes it. “81131-81139”, is also referred to 8113 hereinafter. 
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developing members’ commitments in core business of commercial bank is listed in table A-1 
in annex, which shows that 19 developing members’ commitments don’t cover any sub-sector in 
table 5. So these members’ indexes of trade liberalization are all 0. And in section IV, these 
members are not discussed again. 
 
Table 5: Definition of core business of commercial bank 
 
Classification Core 
service Definition CPCprov 
code Explanatory note 
81115 
Wholesale deposit services：Services consisting in 
large-scale deposit-taking, particularly from other 
financial institutions 
81116 Other bank deposit services: Bank deposit services for persons, companies, etc. 
Deposit 
service 
Acceptance 
of deposits 
and other 
repayable 
funds from 
the public 81119 Other deposit services: Non-bank deposit services for persons, companies, etc. 
81131 
Mortgage loan services: Services consisting in 
granting loans for which specific assets in land and 
buildings are used as security. 
81132 
Personal instalment loan services: Services 
consisting in granting consumer credit especially to 
finance current expenditure on goods and services. 
81133 
Credit card services: Services consisting in 
financing the purchase of products by granting 
point-of-sale credit using plastic cards or tokens. 
Credit 
service 
Lending of 
all types, 
including 
consumer 
credit, 
mortgage 
credit, 
factoring 
and 
financing 
of 
commercial 
transaction 
81139 
Other credit services: Services consisting in other 
lending by institutions not involved in monetary 
intermediation. 
 
IV. Methodology 
 WTO members’ specific commitments schedules imposed a series of restrictive measures 
on core business of commercial banking which depressed trade liberalization. To measure trade 
liberalization is to measure the degree of restrictiveness of measures, which have a negative impact 
on trade liberalization. However, the difficulty is one member’s specific commitments schedule 
usually stipulated a number of measures and members’ measures are different from each other. 
Comparing members’ commitments in general according to a uniform scoring criterion will lead to 
loss of information in commitments. But if the uniform scoring criterion were abandoned, the 
measurement would be random because no specific statistical data can support such measurement 
so far. In other words, because subject estimation is the only way to measure commitments, 
developing an uniform scoring criterion is the key point to make measurement rational. But it’s 
hard to apply one standard to compare all kinds of measures. 
             To make it applicable to compare all kinds of measures and, at the same time, keep the 
uniformity of scoring criterion, this paper employs a structured analysis framework. First, all the 
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measures included in 90 members’ commitments were classified into different categories. Second, 
weights were assigned to each category. Third, only measures in the same category were compared 
and scored based on scoring criterion which is uniform inside a category but varies between 
different categories. In other words, each category has its own uniform scoring criterion.  
a. Weights of sub-sectors 
As discussed in section III, some members’ commitments cover all the seven sub-sectors, 
but some not. The coverage of commitment may have an important impact on trade liberalization. 
In fact, only a part of categories of measures have tight relation with it. For those categories, the 
coverage must be taken into account when measures are quantified. The criterion is as follows, 
If a member’s commitments didn’t cover a sub-sector, its measure score in this sub-sector 
is 0.  
For those sub-sectors covered in a member’s commitments, it’s assumed that sub-sector’s 
market scale decides its importance in the core business of commercial bank. Even taking the 
same measure in two sub-sectors with different market scale, the impact on the general trade 
condition is different. So an estimation of relative market scale of all sub-sectors is necessary, 
which was made and represented by weights, see table 6 
 
Table 6: Sub-sectors’ weights 
Sectors CPCprov code Sub-sector Weights 
81115 Wholesale deposit service 0.2 
81116 Other bank deposit service 0.6 
Deposit  
（weights 0.5） 81119 Other deposit service 0.2 
81131 Mortgage loan services 0.3 
81132 Personal installment loan services 0.25 
81133 Credit card services 0.25 
Credit  
（weights 0.5） 
81139 Other credit services 0.2 
 
 
b. Classification of restrictive measures 
As discussed above, subject estimation was made to quantify the restrictive measures. 
Classification was the first step. Measures classified into the same category have the most similar 
attributes so the comparability increased. Only comparing measures in the same category make it 
easy to focus on the difference between degrees of restrictiveness of measures, excluding the 
noise of other difference. Therefore the subject scoring based on common sense only reflects the 
degree of restrictiveness of measures, which contributed to rational scoring. 
This paper classified all the measures into six categories, listed in table 7, which are 
institution establishing limitation, segmental market limitation, ownership limitation, scale 
limitation, employment limitation and subsidy & tax treatment limitation. Because most of the 
commitments of members are based on GATS-16(2), the six categories cover the definition of 
sub-paragraph a - f in GATS-16(2). The corresponding relation is shown in table 7. 
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Table 7: Classification of restrictive measures 
Categories Weights 
Entry in 
GATS16
（2） 
Explanatory note 
Institution 
establishing 
limitation 
0.35 a，e 
Limit on institution setting in domestic market 
by foreign banks. Legal form are often 
distinguished. 
Segmental 
market 
limitation 
0.25 b，c 
Limit on segmental market access in a sub-
sector. market is often segmented by customers, 
currency, etc. 
Ownership 
limitation 0.2 f，e 
Limit on ownership of institutions set by foreign 
banks in domestic market.  
Scale limitation 0.1 b，c Limit on scale of assets and establishment 
Employment 
limitation 0.05 d 
Limit on citizenship of senior managers or 
clerks 
Subsidy & tax 
treatment 
limitation 
0.05 / Exception on national treatment of subsidies and taxes. 
 
 
Obviously the six categories have different degree of impact on free trade. The first one 
decides directly whether a member’s bank can operate in another member’s market. Some banks 
may be forbidden completely to access a member’s market by such measures. The second one 
can only block a part of domestic market. The others can’t stop foreign banks accessing but just 
restrict the control rights and competition through affecting their equity structure, scale, 
employment structure, profitability, etc. According to the degree of restrictiveness, each measure 
was assigned a weight, also listed in table 7. The score of a measure multiplies by its weight is 
the measurement of its restrictiveness. 
The last category, subsidy & tax treatment limitation is the only restrictive measure of 
national treatment. Because of the provision of GATS-20(2), the measures in column of national 
treatment of member’s schedule are relatively few, some of which can still be merged to market 
access column. Most of the remaining ones belong to subsidy & tax treatment limitation, with a 
few exceptions omitted, 
c. General criterion for quantifying 
 Although scoring criterion varies across categories, there is a general criterion, as follows, 
applied to all the categories. 
The indicator of degree of trade liberalization is index of trade liberalization which range 
from 0 to 10. A member’s index of trade liberalization is a weighted sum of scores of measures 
of all six categories. The score of measure also ranges from 0 to 10. If the measure is “unbound”, 
score is 0. If the measure is “none”, score is 10. 
“Authorization” is a measure used by most members. Sometimes it’s used together with 
another measure, sometimes not. For the former case, the authorized trade condition is also 
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restricted by another measure. For the latter case, the authorized trade condition is completely 
free. In order to treat with both of the two cases according to a uniform criterion, the 
quantification went in two steps. First, the authorized trade condition was scored. Second, the 
authorization measure was scaled by a multiplier, called authorization coefficient, which 
multiplied the score in first step. The product was the final score. If the authorization based on 
discretionary judge or economic demand test, the authorization coefficient is 0.3 and if based on 
specific condition or qualification, it’s 0.35. So if there isn’t other measure accompanying, the 
final score of authorization measure is 3 or 3.5. 
Similar to “authorization”, “grandfather provision” was also scaled by a multiplier, 1.2, 
called grandfather coefficient.  
The same method was applied to “rollback provision” which usually stipulated to cancel 
some measures in future. For such provision, the future trade condition after cancelling some 
measures was scored first. Then the score was multiplied by “time coefficient”. The time 
coefficient is 0.9 if the rollback provision stipulated to cancel measures in five years after the 
commitments entering into force. If it’s in more than five years to cancel measures, the time 
coefficient is 0.8. 
Members’ commitments may not cover all of the six categories of measures. According 
to GATS-16(2), members can not take any restrictive measures not listed in their schedules. So if 
a member’s commitments did not cover a category of measures, such category is scored 10.  
Members’ commitments also do not cover all the sub-sectors. But GATS can not bind 
sectors or sub-sectors not listed in members’ schedules. Those uncovered sub-sectors were 
scored 0. 
              So generally, a member’s index of trade liberalization is calculated in the following 
equation. 
                                                     ∑ ∑ ∑=
i j k
ijkkji XTUWIndex                                                       (1) 
iW  －    weight of sub-sector i 
jU  －    weight of category j 
KT  －    weight of sub-category k 
IJKX  －    score of a particular measure 
 
d. Scoring criteria for institution establishing limitation 
Institution establishing limitation is the first and most important barrier for banking service 
trade. Such kind of measures can keep foreign banks out of domestic market completely. 
Otherwise if it had established an institution in domestic market, a foreign bank acquired the 
platform to further expand or penetrate. Measures in this category are mainly authorization, 
qualification for entering, legal form, etc. 
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Members used a number of terminologies to call the legal form of foreign invested 
institutions, such as joint venture banks, subsidiaries, branches, etc. This paper only distinguishes 
two legal forms, joint venture banks and branches. The former, whose foreign equity share varies 
from minority to 100%, includes all the non-branch institutions except representative office. 
Usually, measures were taken to restrict one of the two type institutions, joint venture 
banks and branches. And the one restricting joint venture banks may not restrict branches. So this 
category’s measures were classified into two sub-categories according to the type of institutions 
they restrict.  The two sub-category measures are scored respectively and their weighted sum is the 
final score of this category, called index of institution establishing freedom.The scoring criterion is 
shown in table 8. 
 
Table 8: scoring criteria for institution setting 
measures score 
Forbid establishing joint venture banks or branches 
0 
No new licenses 0.5 
Number limit 4 
Only permit investing in existing banks instead of 
establishing new joint venture banks 
6 
Specify qualification or condition to establish joint venture 
banks or branches 
7 
None 10 
 
According to the criterion in table 8, members’ measures were scored and reported in table 
A-2 in Annex. EL Salvador, whose measure was “unbound”, and those members, not taking 
measures in this category, were excluded from table A-2, who are Albania, Argentina, Armenia, 
Bolivia, Croatia, Estonia, Gabon, Georgia, Guyana, Israel, Jamaica, Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Mongolia, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, South Africa, Zimbabwe. They are scored 10 
except for EL Salvador scored 0. 
e.   Scoring criteria for segmental market limitation 
Another main barrier for free banking service trade is to segment domestic market and keep 
some segmental markets close to foreign banks although general commitments of market access 
were made. The provision of such measures is usually composed of two parts. The first part is how 
to segment domestic market and the second part is how to restrict the segmental market access. 
The second part shows degree of restrictiveness of measures but the first part shows coverage of 
measures. Both of them are important to quantify this category especially the first part. Because the 
same measures applied to two segmental markets with different scales will affect the trade 
liberalization in different degrees.  
Members often segmented market from three dimensions which are citizenship of 
customers, currency type and legal form of providers. Weights, as table 9 shows, were employed in 
this paper to distinguish the relative importance of different segmental markets based on their 
scales. 
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Table 9: weights of segmental markets 
Dimension Weight 
Resident natural person 0.35 
Resident legal person 0.35 Citizenship of customers 
Non-resident 0.3 
Local currency 0.7 Type of currency Foreign currency 0.3 
Joint venture banks 0.5 Legal form of providers branches 0.5 
 
The scoring criterion is shown in table 10.  
 
Table 10 scoring criteria for segmental market 
measure score 
forbid entrance 0 
authorization Coefficient 0.3 
Restrict qualification of providers 7 
Restrict transaction conditions 8 
 
It’s rational to consider the segmental market as part of the market of a sub-sector because 
different sub-sectors certainly mean different markets, although some members’ commitments 
didn’t show which sub-sector a segmental market belongs to. So first, the weighted sum of scores 
of measures in all segmental markets of a particular sub-sector was figured out as score of such 
sub-sector and second, weighted sum of scores of all sub-sectors was made as the index of 
segmental market freedom. Table A-3 in Annex reported the index of segmental market freedom 
as well as content and relationship of measures, segmental markets and sub-sectors. The indexes of 
members who didn’t take measures in this category are all 10. They are not listed in table A-3, who 
are Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cote d’lvoire, Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Gabon, Georgia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyz, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macau, Macedonia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Slovak, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates. 
f. Scoring criteria for ownership limitation 
Members, on one hand, allowed foreign invested banking institutions provide services in 
domestic market, on the other hand, restricted the ownership of domestic banking assets through 
restricting the ownership of locally established foreign banking institutions. The majority or parts 
of banking assets will be kept by domestic capital through measure of ownership limitation which 
is restricting establishment of branches or restricting share structure of joint venture banks. For 
joint venture banks, members restricted share of either individual foreign stockholder and its 
related parties or aggregate foreign stockholders through setting ceiling of foreign share or 
requiring foreigners to get authorization before investing. A very few members limited the number 
of foreign directors as an additional measure. Different situations were usually distinguished in 
Measuring the Commitments on Financial Services Trade Liberalization 
 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Winter 2008, Vol. 3, No. 4, p68-96 78 
members’ commitments. One is when establishing new joint venture bank, the other is when 
investing in existing banks. 
The scoring criterion of ownership limitation is as follows:  
According to the objects it restricts, the measure of ownership limitations was classified 
into three sub-categories which are limitations on branching, on individual foreign share of joint 
venture banks, and on aggregate foreign share of joint venture banks. They were assigned weights 
as 0.4, 0.3, 0.3 respectively. Each of them was scored independently and the weighted sum of their 
scores is the index of ownership freedom. 
Usually the ceiling of foreign share in members’ commitments is a percentage. Through 
multiplying the percentage by value 10, score of sub-category measures was got directly. But 
sometimes members distinguished the conditions to take measures, which was taken into account 
through assigning the same weights to every conditions and calculating the weighted sum of scores 
of measures under different conditions.  
A special situation in this category is members tended to loose some ceiling by 
discretionary authorization. In such case, the percentage of foreign share was divided into two parts. 
One is the part below the ceiling (form zero to ceiling) and another is the part above the ceiling 
(from ceiling to the theoretic maximum of foreign share, usually 100%). Both of them were scored 
respectively and the score of latter was adjusted by authorization coefficient. Sum of the two parts’ 
score is the final score of such case. 
Table A-4 in Annex reported the index and summary of ownership limitation. The indexes 
of members who didn’t take measures in this category are all 10. They were not listed in table A-4, 
who are Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Bolivia, Croatia, Estonia, Gabon, Georgia, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, South Africa. 
g. Scoring criteria for scale limitation 
Since developing members have all opened their market in different degrees, one of their 
worries is that foreign banks entrance may lead to intense competition and market share decrease 
of domestic banks. So some members also took measures to limit the scale of foreign invested 
banking institutions. However, such measures are mainly imposed on branches or foreign 
controlled joint venture banks. Those joint venture banks where foreign banks only hold minority 
of shares are usually not limited. 
The measure was taken on both asset or transaction scale and establishment scale. For asset 
or transaction scale, some members limited that relating to aggregate foreign banking institutions, 
some limited that relating to individual foreign banking institutions. And the measure often affects 
particular sub-sector or business, which makes the impact of such measures decrease. For 
establishment scale, members usually limited sub-branching, offices and ATM networks. Because 
the limitations on asset or transaction and on establishment scale are entirely different kinds, this 
paper measured them separately. 
The scoring criterion of asset or transaction limitation is discussed as follows. 
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Weight of 0.5 is assigned to each of such measures: measure on aggregate scale and the one 
on individual scale of foreign invested banking institutions. Weighted sum of scores of the two 
measures is the score of asset or transaction limitation. Criterion of segmental market limitation is 
applied here to assign weight to the particular scope a measure affects. Because this kind of 
measures diversify greatly, it’s hard to compare each other. For simple, each measure is scored 5. 
Table A-5(1) in annex reported the score of asset or transaction limitation.  
The scoring criterion of establishment scale limitation is discussed as follows. 
The measure of establishment scale limitation includes three kinds which are sub-branching 
limitation, offices limitation and ATM network limitation. They are assigned weights as 0.5, 0.3, 
0.2 respectively. The weighted sum of scores of all the three kinds of measures is the score of 
establishment scale limitation. For sub-branching limitation, the ceiling of sub-branches’ number is 
used as the score value.  
Table A-5(2) in annex reported the score of establishment scale limitation. 
h.   Scoring criterion for employment limitation 
Some members took measures to limit foreigners to assume the position of CEO or senior 
manager and some limited the proportion of foreign employees in a foreign invested banking 
institution. This paper gave the index of employment freedom directly in table A-6 in the annex 
based on the assumption that limitation on CEO is more important than on senior manager and 
limitation on aggregate foreign employees is the mildest measure. Because employment 
localization is the best way to reduce cost and develop local market. 
i.   Scoring criterion for subsidy & tax treatment limitation 
Subsidy & tax treatment limitation is the main restrictive measure relating to national 
treatment. Other measures on national treatment have been merged to measures on market access 
in the above five categories.  
The scoring criterion of subsidy & tax treatment limitation is as follows. 
Weight of 0.5 is assigned to measures limiting subsidy treatment and tax treatment. 
Because this kind of measures usually limits a particular sub-sector, the weighted sum of scores of 
subsidy treatment limitation and tax treatment limitation is only the sub-sector’s score. The 
weighted sum of sub-sector’s score is the index of subsidy & tax national treatment.  
If a measure of subsidy or tax covers whole sub-sector or whole area, there is no 
discrimination, so it’s scored 9. If a measure only affects a small part of foreign banking institution 
or in a light degree, it’s scored 7. If a measure covers half part of foreign banking institutions, it’s 
scored 4. If a measure discriminates all foreign banking institutions, it’s scored 2. 
Table A-7 in annex reported the index of subsidy & tax national treatment. 
 
 
Measuring the Commitments on Financial Services Trade Liberalization 
 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Winter 2008, Vol. 3, No. 4, p68-96 80 
VI.  Conclusion 
Ninety Members’ final index of trade freedom and index of all six categories of restrictive 
measures were reported in table A-8. 
 
         Table A-1 Coverage of specific commitments schedule 
Member Coverage Member Coverage Member Coverage 
Albania All Gabon 8113 Nicaragua All 
Antigua & 
Bermuda 
 
Nothing Ghana All Nigeria All 
Argentina All Georgia All Oman All 
Armenia All Grenada Nothing Pakistan All 
Bahrain All Guatemala Nothing Panama All 
Barbados Nothing Guyana All Papua New Guinea All 
Belize Nothing Honduras 81116，81119 81132-81139 Paraguay All 
Bolivia All Hong Kong All Peru All 
Botswana Nothing Hungary All Philippines All 
Brazil 81116，8113 India All Poland All 
Brunei 
Darussalam Nothing Indonesia All Qatar All 
Bulgaria All Israel All Romania All 
Cameroon Nothing Jamaica 81115，81116 8113 
St. 
Christopher & 
Nevis 
Nothing 
Chile 8115-81119 81131,81139 Jordan All St. Lucia Nothing 
China All Kenya All 
St. Vincent & 
the 
Grenadines 
Nothing 
Chinese Taipei All Korea All ex.81119 Saudi Arabia All 
Colombia All Kuwait All Singapore All 
Congo Nothing Kyrgyz All Slovak All 
Costa Rica 81115-81119 Latvia All South Africa All 
Cote d’lvoire All Lithuania All Sri Lanka All 
Croatia All Macau All Suriname Nothing 
Cuba All Macedonia All Swaziland Nothing 
Czech REP All Malaysia All Thailand All 
Dominica Nothing Malta All Trinidad & Tobago Nothing 
Dominican 
Republic All ex.81139 Mauritius All Tunisia 
81115，81116 
81131-81133 
Ecuador All Mexico All Turkey All 
Egypt All Moldova All United Arab Emirates All 
El Salvador 81116-81119 81131-81133 Mongolia All Uruguay 
81115，81116 
81132，81133 
Estonia All Morocco All Venezuela 81115，81116 81131-81133 
Fiji Nothing Namibia Nothing Zimbabwe All 
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Table A-2 Index of institution setting freedom 
Summary of measure of institution setting limit Member 
Measure Legal form of institutions 
Index 
Bahrain Need authorization Joint venture & branch 3 
Brazil 
Need authorization. If participating in 
privatization of public sector financial 
institutions, commercial presence is permitted. 
Joint venture & branch 5 
Bulgaria － Joint venture & branch 5 
Chile Need authorization based on economic demand test Joint venture & branch 3 
China 
foreign banks with total assets of more than 
US$10 billion can establish joint venture; with 
total assets of more than US$20 billion can 
establish branch 
Joint venture & branch 7 
Chinese Taipei 
to establish branch, foreign bank shall match 
specified business relation and volume with 
Taiwan enterprises 3 years before applying 
Joint venture & branch 8.5 
Colombia Need authorization based on economic demand test Joint venture & branch 1.5 
Costa Rica － Only joint venture 5 
Cote d’lvoire － Only joint venture 5 
Cube Need authorization Joint venture & branch 3 
Czech Need authorization Joint venture & branch 3 
Dominican 
Republic 
Need authorization based on economic demand 
test Joint venture & branch 3 
Ecuador Only through acquire share of existing banks. No new bank is permitted － 3 
Egypt Establishing branch need authorization based on economic demand test Joint venture & branch 6.5 
Ghana need licence based on prudential requirements － 3.5 
Honduras Need authorization based on economic demand test Only joint venture 1.5 
Hong Kong Need authorization based on specified criteria except for grandfather provision Joint venture & branch 4.2 
Hungary － Only joint venture 5 
India 
a limit of 12 licenses per year both for new and 
existing banks. licenses may be denied when the 
maximum share of assets in India both on and off 
balance sheet of foreign banks to total assets 
both on and off balance sheet of the banking 
system exceeds 15%. 
Only branch 2 
Indonesia Unbound for new licenses Only joint venture except grandfather provision 1 
Jordan － Joint venture & branch 10 
Kenya Need authorization － 3 
Korea － Joint venture & branch 10 
Kuwait 
Foreign banks in which Kuwait government or 
Kuwait banks are shareholders may entry under 
authorization 
－ 2.1 
Macau － Joint venture & branch 10 
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     Table A-2 Index of institution setting freedom -continued 
Summary of measure of institution setting limit Member 
Measure Legal form of institutions 
Index 
Macedonia － Joint venture. branch( no late than 2008) 9 
Malaysia Only through acquire share of existing banks. No new bank is permitted Forbid branch 3 
Malta Need authorization based on economic demand test Joint venture & branch 3 
Mauritius Need authorization based on economic demand test － 3 
Mexico － － 10 
Moldova Need authorization Joint venture & branch 3 
Morocco － Joint venture & branch 10 
Nicaragua Need authorization based on economic demand test Joint venture & branch 3 
Nigeria － Joint venture & branch 10 
Oman － Joint venture & branch 10 
Pakistan license required based on the same criteria applicable to domestic banks 
Only joint venture except for 
grandfather provision 2.75 
Peru Establishing branch need authorization based on economic demand test Joint venture & branch 6.5 
Philippines Need authorization based on public interest and listed economic condistions Joint venture & branch 3.5 
Poland － Joint venture & branch 10 
Saudi Arabia － Joint venture & branch 10 
Singapore No new licenses for joint venture Joint venture & branch 5.5 
Slovak Need authorization based on criteria of profession and so on. Joint venture & branch 3.5 
Sri Lanka Need authorization based on economic demand test Joint venture & branch 3 
Thailand 
No new licenses for joint venture but permit 
acquiring share of existing banks Establishing 
branch need authorization 
Joint venture & branch 4.5 
Tunisia Need authorization － 3 
Turkey Need authorization Joint venture & branch 3 
United Arab 
Emirates － Unbound for branch 5 
Uruguay Need authorization and ceiling of annually new bank entry is 10% of last year Joint venture & branch 1.2 
Venezuela Need authorization based on economic conditions Joint venture & branch 3 
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      Table A-3 Index of segmental market freedom 
Summary of segmental market limitation Member Sub-sector 
Segmental market Measure 
Score Index 
81116 
81119 
branch，resident natural 
persons Forbid 8.25 Armenia 
others13 － － 10 
9.3 
81116 
demand deposits, time deposits, 
savings deposits destined for 
housing finance 
Only open segmental markets 7 Brazil 
8113 － 10 
6.8 
81132，
81133 No commitments 0 Chile 
others － 10 
7.5 
Enterprise local currency 
business,  
Open in two years after 
accession； Must have three 
years operation in China and 
being profitable for two 
consecutive years prior to  the 
application 
Personal local currency business 
Open in five years after 
accession； Must have three 
years operation in China and 
being profitable for two 
consecutive years prior to  the 
application 
6.3 China All14 
Foreign currency business None 10 
7.41 
81116 
foreign exchange checking 
account deposits and foreign 
exchange negotiable certificates 
of time deposit 
Forbid 8.5 
Foreign currency, residents 
only available  when there are 
underlying transactions；
except for post -export loans,  
are not allowed to be converted 
into New Taiwan dollars 
8113 
Foreign currency, non-residents Forbid 
8.68 
Chinese 
Taipei 
others － 10 
8.89 
8113 No commitments 0 Costa 
Rica others － 10 5 
Joint venture banks  Permit 81131 Branches  forbid 5 Czech 
others － 10 
9.25 
81139 No commitments 9 Dominica
n Republic others － 10 9 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 “Others” means all sub-sectors defined in table 3.1 except for those listed before in other rows. 
14 “All” means all sub-sectors defined in table 3.1.  
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Table A-3 Index of segmental market freedom -continued 
Summary of segmental market limitation Sub-sector 
Segmental market Measure 
Score 
Member 
others － 10 
Index 
Egypt All branches，local currency Only open to branches existed on 1992 6.8 6.85 
El 
Salvador All Unbound or no commitments 0 0 
81115－
81119 － Need authorization 3 Estonia 
8113 － 10 
6.5 
81115－
81119 No commitments 0 Gabon 
8113 － 10 
5 
8113 Non-residents Need authorization 7.9 Guyana Others － 10 8.95 
81115，
81131 No commitments 0 Honduras 
Others － 10 
7.5 
81119 No commitments 0 Jamaica Others － 10 9 
Non-residents Need authorization 
Foreign currency Need authorization 81115，
81116 CDs the maturity of CDs shall be more than 30 days 
6.01 
Non-residents Need authorization 
Korea 
8113 Foreign currency 
Need authorization and are 
restricted with respect to 
ceiling and uses 
6.25 
5.44 
Kuwait all Unbound 0 0 
81115－
81119 Foreign currency, residents 
Be subject to conditions 
imposed on designated banks 9.37 Malaysia 
others － 10 
9.69 
81132，
81133 Non-residents Need authorization 7.9 Moldova 
Others － 10 
9.48 
81131，
81139 
Non-residents controlled 
enterprises 
is subject to the borrowing 
entitlements 9.1 Pakistan 
Others － 10 
9.78 
81131 mortgage of real estate forbid 6 Panama Others － 10 8.95 
Foreign currency Need authorization 81115－
81119 Substitute of deposit Need authorization 
5.45 Philippine
s 
Others － 10 
7.73 
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    Table A-3 Index of segmental market freedom-continued 
Summary of segmental market limitation 
Segmental market Measure 
Score Member Sub-sector 
Foreign currency business None 10 
Index 
Residents, local currency Permit 
Residents, foreign currency forbid Romania all 
Non-residents － 
7.9 7.9 
Foreign currency saving 
account，non-residents Need authorization 
restricted banks as provider，
foreign currency fixed deposit 
and current account and more 
than S$250000 local currency 
fixed deposit 
permit 
Restricted banks as provider, 
other deposit services forbid 
Branches，foreign currency 
fixed deposits permit 
Branches，non-residents, fixed 
deposits of more than S$250000 
per deposit  
permit 
81115－
81119 
Branches, other deposit services forbid 
4.89 Singapore 
8113 Local currency, non-residents Need authorization 8.43 
6.66 
81115，
81116 
“Non-resident banks”，
residents Need authorization 7.55 
81131 “Non-resident banks” Need authorization 6.5 Tunisia15 
81132，
81133 “Resident banks” permit 5 
5.25 
81119，
81131，
81139 
No commitments 0 Uruguay 
Others － 10 
6.5 
81119，
81139 No commitments 0 Venezuela 
Others － 10 
8 
81139 loan for building forbid 5 Zimbabwe Others － 10 9.5 
 
                                                     
15 Tunisia classifies banks into two types, resident-bank and non-resident bank. The former mainly services resident  
customers and the latter mainly services non-resident customers. 
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               Table A-4 Index of ownership freedom 
Summary of ownership limitations 
Member Index Branches 
establishing 
Individual foreign 
share limit 
Aggregate foreign 
share limit 
Foreign  
director limit 
Bahrain 2.67 Need authorization unbound 49％ － 
Bolivia 10  － － － 
Brazil 7.2 Need authorization － － － 
Bulgaria 4.01 forbid － 
acquisition of 5% or 
more voting rights of 
existing one need 
approval 
－ 
Chile 5.31 
Need authorization 
based on economic 
demand test 
without  
authorization, can't 
acquire more than 
10% equity  
－ － 
China 4.3 
Foreign banks with 
assets more than 
US$ 20 billion are 
permitted  
－ 25％ － 
Chinese 
Taipei 7.01 
foreign banks are 
permitted who 
matches specified 
business relation and 
volume with Taiwan 
enterprises 3 years 
before applying 
Individual 5%, 
related party 15%, 
unless obtain 
approval 
－ － 
Colombia 6 forbid － － － 
Costa Rica 6 forbid － － － 
Cote 
d’lvoire 6 forbid － － － 
Cuba 4.14 Need authorization － 49％ － 
Czech 6.15 Need authorization 
purchase of shares of 
existing banks is 
subject to prior 
approval  
－ － 
Dominican 
Republic 4.14 
Need authorization 
based on economic 
demand test 
－ 49％ － 
Ecuador 6 forbid － － － 
Egypt 5.31 
Need authorization 
based on economic 
demand test 
acquiring more than 
10% need approval No ceiling － 
El Salvador 2.5  acquiring more than 1% need approval 
at least 75% share can 
be hold by foreign 
bank with first grade 
risk rating; 
－ 
Ghana 7.4 
need authorization 
based on prudential 
requirements 
－ － － 
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able A-4 Index of ownership freedom-continued 
Summary of ownership limitations 
Member Index Branches 
establishing 
Individual foreign 
share limit 
Aggregate foreign 
share limit 
Foreign  
director limit 
Honduras 6 forbid － － － 
Hong Kong 6.63 
Need authorization 
based on specified 
conditions except 
for grandfather 
provision 
acquire existing local 
bank require approval － － 
Hungary 5.7 forbid － － at least 2 must be residents 
India 3.9 forbid 
investment in existing 
bank can't exceed 
10% of owned funds 
or 30% of capital of 
the existing bank, 
whichever is lower 
－ － 
Indonesia 3.93 
Forbid, except for 
grandfather 
provision 
－ 49% except for grandfather provision － 
Israel 9.7  － － at least 2 must be residents 
Jordan 10 Permit － － － 
Kenya 7.2 Need authorization － － － 
Korea 5.19 Permit 
Ceiling is 4%，but 
15% for provincial 
banks 
limited － 
Kuwait 3.24 
Foreign banks in 
which Kuwait 
government or 
Kuwait banks are 
shareholders may 
entry under 
authorization 
－ 40％ － 
Macau 9.7 Permit － － 
at least 3 
directors and 2 
of them must 
be residents in 
Macau 
Macedonia 9.2 Permit no later than 2008 － － － 
Malaysia 1.32 Forbid 
Ceiling is 20%. To 
acquire more than 
5%, banks must 
match specified 
criteria 
30% － 
Malta 3 
Need authorization 
based on economic 
demand test 
equity participation 
need authorization 
equity participation 
need authorization － 
      
 
Measuring the Commitments on Financial Services Trade Liberalization 
 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Winter 2008, Vol. 3, No. 4, p68-96 88 
 
 
Table A-4 Index of ownership freedom-continued 
Summary of ownership limitations 
Member Index Branches 
establishing 
Individual foreign 
share limit 
Aggregate foreign 
share limit 
Foreign  
director limit 
Mauritius 7.2 
Need authorization 
based on economic 
demand test 
－ － － 
Mexico 5.49 Permit 5%, or 20%with authorization 
40%,effective control 
by Mexican 
shareholders is 
required 
－ 
Moldova 7.2 Need authorization － － － 
Morocco 8.8 Permit － 
Limitation on the 
participation of foreign 
capital in the capital of 
the large existing bank 
which would lead to 
takeover 
－ 
Nicaragua 7.2 
Need authorization 
based on economic 
demand test 
－ － － 
Nigeria 10 Permit － － － 
Oman 6.1 Permit － 35％ － 
Pakistan 4.08 
license required 
based on the same 
criteria applicable to 
domestic banks 
More than 5% need 
authorization 49％  
Peru 5.31 
Need authorization 
based on economic 
demand test 
More than 10% need 
authorization － － 
Philippines 5.66 
Need authorization 
based on public 
interest and listed 
conditions 
51％ in new 
established bank; 
30% or 40% with 
authorization in 
existing bank  
－ － 
Poland 10 Permit － － － 
Saudi 
Arabia 7.6 Permit － 60% － 
Singapore 5.35 Permit 5％ 40％ － 
Slovak 5.3 
Need authorization 
based on criteria of 
profession  
equity participation in 
existing bank need 
authorization 
equity participation in 
existing bank need 
authorization 
－ 
Sri Lanka 4.14 
Need authorization 
based on economic 
demand test 
－ 49％ － 
Thailand 3.03 Need authorization 5％, but may be relaxed 
25%,may be relaxed. 
factoring and credit 
card business is 49%  
At least 75% 
of the 
directors is 
Thai 
nationality 
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Table A-4 Index of ownership freedom-continued 
Summary of ownership limitations 
Member Index Branches 
establishing 
Individual foreign 
share limit 
Aggregate foreign 
share limit 
Foreign  
director limit 
Tunisia 5.7 Need authorization － 50％ in existing bank － 
Turkey 6.68 Need authorization 
acquisition or transfer 
of shares equal or 
higher than 
5%,20%,33%,50％ 
require approval 
－ － 
United Arab 
Emirates 2.94 Unbound － 49％ － 
Uruguay 5.8 Need authorization － － － 
Venezuela 7.2 
Need authorization 
based on economic 
demand test 
－ － － 
Zimbabwe 7.6 － － 60％ － 
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 Table A-5(1) Score of asset or transaction scale limitation  
Summary of asset or transaction scale limitation Member Aggregate scale Individual scale Score 
Chinese 
Taipei － 
Foreign banks are subject to per client 
foreign currency credit extension limit of 
25% of the net worth of their head office; 
and per client New Taiwan dollar credit 
extension limit of 10% of the total 
balance of New Taiwan dollars credit 
extension or one billion New Taiwan 
dollars, whichever is higher. 
8.75 
Malaysia 
foreign controlled banking institutions16 in 
Malaysia are allowed to extend credit 
facilities, including factoring and leasing up 
to a maximum of 40% of the total credit 
facilities obtained by non-resident controlled 
companies from banking institutions. The 
limitation will be relaxed to 50% in the year 
2000.  
－ 9.38 
Pakistan 
bound for the total volume of foreign banks' 
assets in Pakistan and total volume of 
deposits mobilized by foreign bank on Dec 
12 1997 
－ 7.5 
Philippines 
70% total assets of banking system must be 
held by domestic banks which are at least 
majority-owned by Filipinos. 
－ 7.5 
Singapore － local currency loan to residents shall not exceed S$200m 9.39 
South 
Africa － 
branches must maintain a minimum 
balance of R 1 million on the deposit 
accounts of natural persons 
9.38 
Tunisia 
all non-resident banks established in Tunisia 
as a whole, 1.5% of the deposits of deposit 
banks. 
funds from residents received by non-
resident bank established in Tunisia must 
not exceed its share of equity of resident 
enterprises 
8.94 
Turkey － lending limit of foreign bank branch is based on branch capital 9.38 
 
                                                     
16 There are 13 grandfathered wholly-foreign owned commercial banks. 
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         Table A-5(2) Score of establishment scale limitation  
Summary of establishment scale limitation Member 
Sub-branching Office ATM network 
Score 
Bahrain Unbound for sub-branching of foreign bank branch － － 7.5 
Brazil Need authorization except grandfather provision － － 6.8 
China － 
gradually remove 
geographic restriction within 
5 years after accession 
－ 9.7 
Hong Kong － No more than 3 offices for branch Only in office 7.3 
India － － Need authorization 8.6 
Indonesia Only one sub-branch Only set up in 8 designated cities － 4 
Malaysia － Unbound Unbound 5 
Oman In capital of Oman, sub-branches are limited to 4  － － 8.5 
Pakistan 3 － － 6.5 
Philippines 
No more than 6 sub-
branches for foreign bank 
branch 
3 at locations of own choices 
and 3 at designated locations － 8.4 
Qatar 8 － － 9 
Singapore Forbid new sub-branch Only one in designated location Only in office 0.5 
Thailand － － 
For foreign bank 
branch: only joining 
ATM pools operated 
by Thai banks or 
within own premises 
or sharing the 
facilities with other 
commercial banks in 
Thailand 
8.8 
Turkey Need authorization － － 6.5 
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                         Table A-6 Index of employment freedom 
Position unavailable for non-
residents 
Member Index 
CEO Senior manager 
15% of 
the 
staff 
More 
than 
15% 
of the 
staff 
Summary of employment limitation 
Bolivia 9     the number of foreign employees may not 
exceed 15% of the staff 
Chile 9     the number of foreign employees may not 
exceed 15% of the staff 
Georgia 9     at least one manager with his domicile in 
George 
Hong Kong 6     CEO must be resident 
India 9     Must constitute local advisory boards 
consisting of professionals and experts in 
small-scale industry and exports. The chairman 
and members of the board must be resident 
Indian nationals 
Indonesia 4     for branch, only executive position can be 
assumed by expatriates  
Lithuania 8     at least one manager must be Lithuanian 
citizen 
Macau 7     For branch, CEO must be resident  
Panama 9     Foreign technical employees may not exceed 
15% of the total workforce. 
Poland 8     at least one executive must be Poland national 
Thailand 7     Ceiling of foreign employees is 8.17 
Venezuela 8     no less than 50% of the administrative board of 
bank must reside in Venezuela.  
Resource:  author compiled.         means unavailable for non-residents;         means partially unavailable for non-
residents. 
                                                     
17 Thailand stipulated ceiling of foreign employees in from 2 to 8 for foreign banks institutions with different licenses. 
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                     Table A-7 index of subsidy & tax national treatment 
Member Sub-sector Index Subsidy Tax 
Bahrain All 0 Unbound Unbound 
Brazil 81116，8113 8 National treatment National treatment 
Chile 81115－81119 
81131，81139 7.5 National treatment National treatment 
Costa Rica 81115－81119 5 National treatment National treatment 
Dominican 
Republic 
81115－81119 
81131－81133 5 Unbound for 81131－81133 Unbound for 81131－81133 
El Salvador 81116，81119 
81131－81133 0 Unbound Unbound 
Gabon 8113 5 National treatment National treatment 
Ghana All 8.5 Government support bank located in rural area National treatment 
Honduras 81116，81119 
81132－81139 7.5 National treatment National treatment 
Hungary All 5 Unbound National treatment 
Jamaica 81115，81116 8113 9 National treatment National treatment 
Jordan All 5 Unbound National treatment 
Kenya All 0 Unbound Unbound 
Korea 81115，81116 8113 9 National treatment National treatment 
Kuwait All 0 Unbound Unbound 
Lithuania All 8 
eligibility of subsidies maybe 
limited to legal persons within 
the territory of Lithuania 
National treatment 
Nicaragua All 8.5 National treatment 
Tax rate of payment of dividends 
to foreigners is 5%, tax of 
interest payment abroad is 30% 
Oman All 7 National treatment 
bank with more than 70% foreign 
equity should pay higher rate 
income tax 
Saudi Arabia All 6 National treatment income tax to foreign bank 
Tunisia 81115，81116 
81131－81133 4.75 
National treatment only for 
resident banks in 81115，
81116，81132，81133; 
National treatment for 81131 
National treatment only for 
resident banks in 81115，
81116，81132，81133; National 
treatment for 81131 
United Arab 
Emirates All 2 may offer subsidy to nationals 
foreigners may be required to pay 
direct tax on income 
Uruguay 81115，81116 
81132，81133 6.5 National treatment National treatment 
Venezuela 81115，81116 
81131－81133 8 National treatment National treatment 
 
Measuring the Commitments on Financial Services Trade Liberalization 
 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Winter 2008, Vol. 3, No. 4, p68-96 94 
     
     Table A-8 summary of index of trade freedom 
Member 
Index of 
trade 
freedom 
Index of 
institution 
setting 
freedom 
Index of 
segmental 
market 
freedom 
Index of 
ownership 
freedom 
Index 
scale 
freedom 
Index of 
employment 
freedom 
Index of 
subsidy & 
tax national 
treatment 
Albania 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Antigua & 
Bermuda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Argentina 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Armenia 9.83 10 9.3 10 10 10 10 
Bahrain 1.96 3 0 2.67 3.75 0 0 
Barbados 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belize 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia 9.95 10 10 10 10 9 10 
Botswana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 6.63 5 6.8 7.2 8.4 10 8 
Brunei 
Darussalam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 7.05 5 10 4.01 10 10 10 
Cameroon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 5.81 3 7.5 5.31 10 9 7.5 
China 7.15 7 7.41 4.3 9.85 10 10 
Chinese 
Taipei 8.54 8.5 8.89 7.01 9.38 10 10 
Colombia 6.23 1.5 10 6 10 10 10 
Congo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 5.95 5 5 6 10 10 5 
Cote 
d'lvoire 7.45 5 10 6 10 10 10 
Croatia 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Cuba 6.38 3 10 4.14 10 10 10 
Czech 
Republic 6.59 3 9.25 6.15 10 10 10 
Dominica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dominican 
Republic 5.88 3 9 4.14 10 10 5 
Ecuador 6.75 3 10 6 10 10 10 
Egypt 7.05 6.5 6.85 5.31 10 10 10 
El Salvador 0.45 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 
Estonia 9.13 10 6.5 10 10 10 10 
Fiji 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gabon 8.5 10 5 10 10 10 5 
Ghana 7.13 3.5 10 7.4 10 10 8.5 
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Table A-8 summary of index of trade freedom-continued 
Member 
Index of 
trade 
freedom 
Index of 
institution 
setting 
freedom 
Index of 
segmental 
market 
freedom 
Index of 
ownership 
freedom 
Index 
scale 
freedom 
Index of 
employment 
freedom 
Index of 
subsidy & 
tax national 
treatment 
Georgia 9.95 10 10 10 10 9 10 
Grenada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guyana 9.74 10 8.95 10 10 10 10 
Honduras 5.48 1.5 7.5 6 10 10 7.5 
Hong Kong 6.96 4.2 10 6.63 8.65 6 10 
Hungary 7.14 5 10 5.7 10 10 5 
India 5.86 2 10 3.9 9.3 9 10 
Indonesia 5.04 1 10 3.93 7 4 10 
Israel 9.94 10 10 9.7 10 10 10 
Jamaica 9.7 10 9 10 10 10 9 
Jordan 9.75 10 10 10 10 10 5 
Kenya 6.49 3 10 7.2 10 10 0 
Korea 7.85 10 5.44 5.19 10 10 9 
Kuwait 1.38 2.1 0 3.24 0 0 0 
Kyrgyz 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Latvia 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Lithuania 9.8 10 10 10 10 8 8 
Macau 9.79 10 10 9.7 10 7 10 
Macedonia 9.49 9 10 9.2 10 10 10 
Malaysia 5.45 3 9.69 1.32 7.19 10 10 
Malta 6.15 3 10 3 10 10 10 
Mauritius 6.99 3 10 7.2 10 10 10 
Mexico 9.1 10 10 5.49 10 10 10 
Moldova 6.86 3 9.48 7.2 10 10 10 
Mongolia 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Morocco 9.76 10 10 8.8 10 10 10 
Namibia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 6.92 3 10 7.2 10 10 8.5 
Nigeria 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Oman 9 10 10 6.1 9.25 10 7 
Pakistan 5.92 2.75 9.78 4.08 7 10 10 
Panama 9.69 10 8.95 10 10 9 10 
 
Measuring the Commitments on Financial Services Trade Liberalization 
 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Winter 2008, Vol. 3, No. 4, p68-96 96 
     
 
      Table A-8 summary of index of trade freedom-continued 
Member 
Index of 
trade 
freedom 
Index of 
institution 
setting 
freedom 
Index of 
segmental 
market 
freedom 
Index of 
ownership 
freedom 
Index 
scale 
freedom 
Index of 
employment 
freedom 
Index of 
subsidy & 
tax national 
treatment 
Papua New 
Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paraguay 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Peru 7.84 6.5 10 5.31 10 10 10 
Philippines 6.08 3.5 7.73 5.66 7.95 10 10 
Poland 9.9 10 10 10 10 8 10 
Qatar 9.95 10 10 10 9.5 10 10 
Romania 9.48 10 7.9 10 10 10 10 
Saint 
Christopher 
and Nevis 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saint Lucia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saudi 
Arabia 9.32 10 10 7.6 10 10 6 
Singapore 6.15 5.5 6.66 5.35 4.95 10 10 
Slovak 
Republic 6.79 3.5 10 5.3 10 10 10 
South 
Africa 9.97 10 10 10 9.69 10 10 
Sri  Lanka 6.38 3 10 4.14 10 10 10 
St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Suriname 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thailand 6.47 4.5 10 3.03 9.4 7 10 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 5.19 3 5.25 5.7 9.47 10 4.75 
Turkey 6.68 3 10 6.68 7.94 10 10 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 
6.44 5 10 2.94 10 10 2 
Uruguay 5.03 1.2 6.5 5.8 10 10 6.5 
Venezuela 6.29 3 8 7.2 10 8 8 
Zimbabwe 9.4 10 9.5 7.6 10 10 10 
 
 
 
 
 
